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MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY:
A QUESTION OF IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust litigation directed at municipalities has grown significantly
in the last decade.' This litigation has arisen in various contexts in-
cluding cable television franchises,2 waste collection and disposal,3
1. See Victoria M. Mather, Antitrust Implications of Municipal Land Use Planning,
33 WAYNE L. REv. 965, 966 (1987) (discussing the past, present, and future of munici-
pal antitrust liability in the context of land use planning and zoning); see also Richard S.
Williamson, Commentary: The Reagan Administration's Position on Antitrust Liability
of Municipalities, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 371 (1983) (discussing the proliferation of the
application of antitrust laws to state and local governments during the Reagan era).
2. For examples of cases involving cable television, see, e.g., Community Communi-
cations Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that a city moratorium on
cable service expansion is not exempt from federal antitrust liability); Nor-West Cable
Communications Partnership v. City of St. Paul, 924 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1991) (chal-
lenging the award of a single franchise to a cable operation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2853 (1991); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396,
1415 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"
state policy standard to hold that the city properly "displaced competition with regula-
tion"), aff'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Catalina Cablevision Assoc. v. City of Tucson, 745
F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a city may, without being subject to federal
antitrust scrutiny, issue a single, non-exclusive cable television license); Omega Satellite
Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that a limited
partnership may challenge the city's grant of de facto exclusive franchises); Carlson
T.V. v. City of Marble, 612 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1985) (noting that a state statute
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" policy to exempt the city from anti-
trust liability); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Mich. 1985)
(noting that the state action doctrine exempted village trustees from federal antitrust
liability); Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the
state action doctrine shields defendants from causes of action brought under state stat-
ute governing theft of cable services).
3. For examples of recent cases involving waste collection and disposal, see L & H
Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1985) (exclusive
franchise challenged); Tom Hudson & Assoc. v. City of Chula Vista, 746 F.2d 1370
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water,4 sewers,5 electrical power,6 telephones,7 ambulance services,8
health services,9 airport services,' 0 land use planning, 1 and many
(9th Cir. 1984) (municipal award of exclusive contract), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1028
(1985); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984) (city mo-
nopolization of waste collection and disposal), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); Cen-
tral Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419
(8th Cir. 1983) (noting that state action exempted a challenge to a state statute mandat-
ing that all solid waste be brought to municipal landfill), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003
(1985); Heille v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1982) (municipality entered
trash collection business); Ideal Waste Sys., Inc. v. Provo City Corp., 605 F. Supp. 100
(D. Utah 1985) (denying city immunity where ban on waste hauling did not meet state
action requirements).
4. For examples of cases involving water, see Auton v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 1009
(1 lth Cir. 1986) (challenging ordinance that prohibited construction of private water
wells); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of DuPage, 777 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1985) (chal-
lenging joint activity of municipalities), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Community
Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981) (challenging charge for
hook-up fees in area previously serviced by another city).
5. For examples of recent cases involving sewers, see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (challenging an annexation requirement to tie into sewer
system); Vickery Manor Serv. Corp. v. Mundelein, 575 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(challenging municipal sewer requirements for developer).
6. For examples of recent cases involving power, see Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacra-
mento Mun. Util. Dist., 770 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1985) (challenging a municipal utility
district operation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986); Rural Elec. Co. v. Cheyenne
Light, Fuel & Power Co., 762 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1985) (challenging a grant of nonex-
clusive franchise to a public utility); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.,
497 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Conn. 1980) (noting that municipalities' participation in lawsuit
not anticompetitive), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981).
7. For examples of recent cases involving telephone services, see Capital Tel. Co. v.
New York Tel. Co., 750 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1984) (challenging differences in services
and charges and holding that state action immunized phone company's conduct from
antitrust scrutiny), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985); Capital Tel. Co. v. City of Sche-
nectady, 560 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (challenging denial of telephone line service
franchise); Jackson v. Taylor, 539 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1982) (challenging actions by a
municipal jailor for price-fixing telephone services), aff'd, 713 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
8. For examples of recent cases involving ambulance service, see Springs Ambu-
lance Serv., Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 745 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1984) (challenging
free city ambulance service); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City,
705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) (challenging exclusive franchise for ambulance service),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. G & L Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 142 (D. Conn. 1985) (challenging exclusive contract for ambu-
lance services), aff'd, 787 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1986); Mercy-Peninsula Ambulance, Inc. v.
County of San Mateo, 592 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (challenging a refusal to
certify paramedics), aff'd, 791 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1986).
9. For examples of recent cases involving health services, see Marrese v. Interqual,
Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984) (challenging revocation of doctor's clinical privi-
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leges), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of Dental Exam-
iners, 673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982) (challenging dental licensing law); Hospital Dev. and
Ser. Corp. v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 619 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (challeng-
ing district's policies regarding indigent patients); Addino v. Genesee Valley Medical
Care, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding no immunity for state action
nonprofit corporation's health insurance plan deemed to be a private corporation); Bra-
zil v. Arkansas Bd. of Dental Examiners, 593 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (challeng-
ing state board and private state dental association activities), aff'd, 759 F.2d 674 (8th
Cir. 1985); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1983)
(refusal to grant podiatrist hospital privileges), aff'd, 752 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985). For a discussion of the health care antitrust liability
issue, see William R. Trail & Susan Kelley-Claybrook, Hospital Liability and the Staff
Privileges Dilemma, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 315, 348-62 (1985) (discussing potential health
care antitrust liability for denial of staff privileges).
10. For examples of recent cases involving airport services, see Independent Taxi-
cab Drivers' Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.) (chal-
lenging an exclusive franchise granted for airport transportation), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
903 (1985); Lorrie's Travel & Tours, Inc. v. SFO Airporter, Inc., 753 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.
1985) (challenging grant of exclusive airport transportation contract); Deak-Perera Ha-
waii, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 745 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1984) (challenging grant of
exclusive currency exchange), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985); Pueblo Aircraft Serv.,
Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982) (challenging operation of airport
concession), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983); Greyhound Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. City of
Pensacola, 676 F.2d 1380 (1Ith Cir. 1982) (challenging denial of license to operate air-
port rent-a-car facility), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1171 (1983); Wellwoods Dev. Co. v. City
of Aurora, 631 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (challenging competition for fixed-based
operators), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987); Transport Limousine v. Port Auth.,
571 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (challenging a percentage fee by a limousine opera-
tor); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(challenging airport authority's space allocation), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1984);
All Am. Cab Co. v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Auth., 547 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.
Tenn. 1982) (challenging monopolization of airport ground transportation), aff'd, 723
F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1983).
11. For examples of recent cases involving land use planning, see Scott v. City of
Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984) (challenging restriction of commercial devel-
opment in outlying areas to promote urban renewal), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985);
Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983) (challenging municipality's refusal to
vacate platted streets without concessions from developer); Westborough Mall, Inc. v.
City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982) (challenging city's rezoning in
favor of developer's competitor), cert denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Miracle Mile Assoc.
v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980) (challenging city's efforts to require
developer's compliance with state and federal environmental legislation); Brontel Ltd. v.
City of New York, 571 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (challenging a city exempted
city-owned property from rent control), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 882 (1984); Ossler v. Village of Norridge, 557 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (chal-
lenging a refusal to rezone and increase development potential); Mason City Center
Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (challenging refusal
to rezone property to permit regional shopping center), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 671
F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
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other areas.12 In 1982, the United States Supreme Court in Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,13 held that the regulatory
activities of local governments 4 and agencies were not exempt from
antitrust liability."i The decision increased considerable doubt about a
local government's ability to act in areas of traditional municipal regu-
lation, and increased the spectrum of treble damage liability. 16
12. See also Hefner v. Alexander, 779 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1985) (challenging an
attorney disciplinary proceeding); Riverview Inv., Inc. v. Ottowa Community Improve-
ment Corp., 774 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1985) (challenging a refusal to issue industrial reve-
nue bonds); Garcia v. Colorado State Bd. of Law Examiners, 760 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.)
(challenging grading of bar exam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 856 (1985); First Am. Title
Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983) (challenging state
agency regulations on abstracting), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Euster v. Eagle
Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.) (challenging racing commission establish-
ment of jockey pay), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1982); Parks v. Donrey, Inc., 596 F.
Supp. 347 (W.D. Ark. 1984) (challenging a sign ordinance that restricted outdoor ad-
vertising); Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 571 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (chal-
lenging the state lime business), aff'd, 778 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1985).
13. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
14. "Local governments" include counties, cities, towns, and municipal corpora-
tions. See Ellen J. Tchorni, Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Mu-
nicipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo.
L.J. 1547, 1556-61 (1977) (discussing the scope of the term "municipality" to include
only those entities having governmental-proprietary functions but not those purely gov-
ernmental in character).
15. 455 U.S. at 48-57 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade of commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The other federal antitrust laws of general application are the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988), and portions of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-44 (1988). See generally WILLIAM C. HOLMES, 1983-84 ANTITRUST
LAW HANDBOOK (1991) (providing a comprehensive overview of antitrust law); 1
EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.18 (1980) (addressing the in-
tended scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act); Paul R. Dixon, Antitrust Policy: Some
"'Legal" and "Economic" Considerations, 14 UCLA L. REv. 979 (1967) (discussing the
effect of antitrust law on economic efficiency and fair play in the marketplace); Allen C.
Holmes, Have the Antitrust Laws Promised Too Much and Accomplished Too Little?, 46
ANTrrRUST L.J. 764 (1977) (evaluating the success of antitrust laws in achieving the
stated goals of the legislation).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
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The United States Supreme Court recently readdressed the liability
standard for municipal regulations in City of Columbia v. Omni Out-
door Advertising, Inc. 17 The Court in Omni extended the antitrust ex-
emptions defined for state governments - known as the state action
immunity doctrine - to municipal and local governments, and re-
solved certain conflicts about the doctrine's purpose and relationship to
municipalities. 8
This Recent Development discusses the past, present, and future of
municipal antitrust liability. Part I explains the history of municipal
antitrust liability. Part II analyzes the Omni decision which enlarged
the municipal exemption from antitrust liability. Finally, Part III dis-
cusses how the Omni decision impacts both present and future munici-
pal conduct relating to economic regulation.
I. HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The state action immunity doctrine exempts anticompetitive activi-
ties established and controlled by the state from Sherman Antitrust
liability.19 The United States Supreme Court first announced the state
action immunity doctrine2" in Parker v. Brown 2 when it upheld a Cal-
ifornia agricultural marketing system restricting competition among
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may award
under this section, pursuant to a motion by such person promptly made, simple
interest on actual damages for the period beginning on the date of service of such
person's pleading setting forth a claim under the antitrust laws and ending on the
date of judgment, or for any shorter period therein, if the court finds that the award
of such interest for such period is just in the circumstances....
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (emphasis added).
17. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
18. Id. at 1351-56. See also infra notes 62-90 and accompanying text for a detailed
analysis of the Omni case.
19. The exact label that attaches to the state action doctrine varies. The doctrine is
often referred to as an "exemption," "immunity", "preemption" analysis. Yet, while
the label may differ, the inquiry and analysis remains the same. See Michal Dlouhy,
Note, Judicial Review as Midcal Active Supervision: Immunizing Private Parties From
Antitrust Liability, 57 FORDHAM L. Rv. 403, 405 n.19 (1988) for a discussion of the
subtle distinctions between preemption, exemption, and immunity.
20. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). The exemption first appeared in
cases immediately following the enactment of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Olsen v.
Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904) (holding that the state may regulate the licensing of
harbor pilots).
21. 317 U.S. at 341 (1943).
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raisin growers.2 2 In Parker, a raisin producer alleged that the Califor-
nia Director of Agriculture violated the Sherman Antitrust Act
through the enforcement of regulations regarding price and commodity
distribution controls.23 The United States Supreme Court refused to
impose Sherman antitrust liability upon the state administrative agency
because the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibited individual and not state
action.24
Following Parker, the United States Supreme Court has focused on
the meaning of "state action" and the development of standards for the
application of the state action immunity doctrine.25 Generally, direct
state involvement as a government actor is necessary to apply the doc-
22. Id. at 352. The Parker Court found that the prorate program was never in-
tended to operate as an individual agreement or without legislative command. Id. The
Court also noted that, although the actual prorate program was petitioned for and oper-
ated by the producers, the state itself created the administrative machinery, approved
the program, and enforced the sanctions within the California Prorate Act. Id.
23. 317 U.S. at 344. Defendants other than the California Director of Agriculture
included the members of the State Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission and
others charged by the California statute with the administration of the California Agri-
cultural Prorate Act. Id. The plaintiff was a private individual allegedly affected by the
enforcement of the Prorate Act. Id. The Prorate Act mandated a petition by ten pro-
ducers to be filed and public hearings held by the Advisory Commission to decide
whether a prorate marketing plan should be established within a defined production
zone. Id. at 346. The program was intended to conserve the agricultural wealth of the
state and prevent waste. 317 U.S. at 346. Upon the petition's approval, a program
committee of private producers regulated the marketing of the commodity involved. Id.
at 347. In Parker, all raisins from the defined zone must be sent to program receiving
stations for quality grading. Id. The program pooled a large portion of the raisins for
market distribution and subjected it to price standardization. Id. at 346-48.
24. 317 U.S. at 351-52. The Supreme Court stated:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which sug-
gests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
Id. at 350-51.
25. See generally California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (holding that a California statute which required wine pro-
ducers to post prices or face license revocation violated the Sherman Act); New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110 (1978) (holding that the state may
properly require automobile manufacturers to obtain state approval before obtaining a
new dealership or relocating an existing one); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394-97 (1978) (noting that the definition of "person" under
antitrust law includes cities); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (hold-
ing that state regulation of legal practice through disciplinary rules promulgated by
state supreme court did not violate the Sherman Act); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
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trine.26 No state action exists for Sherman Act purposes unless the
state preempts the anticompetitive conduct and directs the conduct in
its sovereign capacity.27 The Parker doctrine applies when a signifi-
cant state interest exists and when state policy for anticompetitive con-
duct is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed with active state
supervision.25
Municipalities have no inherent regulatory power; instead, they de-
rive their regulatory authority from the chartering state.2 9 Past United
States Supreme Court decisions have applied the state action exemp-
tion directly to state regulation and only indirectly to municipal regula-
tion.3 ° Nevertheless, the state has the power, if it chooses, to transfer
the state action exemption along with its regulatory powers to the
421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (holding that a minimum fee schedule enforced by a state bar
association violated the Sherman Act as unfair price-fixing).
26. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court held that to
determine whether the Parker doctrine applies, "[t]he threshold inquiry ... is whether
the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." Id. at 790. See also Stephen
C. Sherrill, Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb,
Cantor, and Bates, 77 COLUm. L. REV. 898, 902-13 (1977) (discussing how the
Supreme Court's decisions in Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates affected the state action doc-
trine, and explaining the proper state action immunity inquiry).
27. 421 U.S. at 791.
28. See Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977). In Bates, appel-
lants were attorneys licensed in Arizona and members of the state bar. Id. at 353.
Appellants advertised their services and the state bar recommended suspension pursu-
ant to Arizona Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules which prohibit such advertising. Id.
at 354-55. In an action against the state bar for an alleged violation of the Sherman Act,
the state bar claimed an exemption from antitrust scrutiny under the Parker doctrine.
Id. at 359. In holding that the Parker doctrine applied, the Bates Court distinguished
Goldfarb and Cantor. 433 U.S. at 359-62. The Court distinguished Goldfarb because
no Virginia Supreme Court Rule required anticompetitive activities. Id. at 359-60. In
contrast, the Court distinguished Cantor because Cantor involved a private defendant,
while in Bates, the Court noted that the real party in interest was the state. Id. at 361.
The Bates Court characterized the state bar as an agent of the court under its continu-
ous supervision with the bar's role completely defined by the court. Id. The Court also
noted a difference in the state interest in Bates, emphasizing that the state's interest in
the regulation of lawyers is historically critical. 433 U.S. at 361-62. Furthermore, the
Bates court noted that the state clearly expressed its policy regarding professional be-
havior. Id. at 362. See generally Sherrill, supra note 16.
29. See generally S. Paul Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation
and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974) (discussing the division
of regulatory powers between states and their municipalities).
30. See supra note 2 for a comprehensive list of lower federal court cases which
analyze the state action exemption to municipalities in various contexts.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
420 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:413
municipalities.3"
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 2 the Supreme
Court addressed the state action doctrine and its application to munici-
palities. In Lafayette, two municipalities operating electric utilities
sued a private utility for antitrust violations.3 The private utility
counterclaimed for antitrust violations against the municipalities.3 4
The private utility challenged an arrangement under which the cities
would provide gas and water service to a customer only if the customer
purchased the municipality's electricity. 5 The Supreme Court nar-
rowly construed the state's authorization of regulatory authority to a
city and held that conduct falling outside the authorization also falls
outside the state action exemption.3 6 The Lafayette Court recognized
that while the state's anticompetitive conduct was automatically im-
mune, state subdivisions were immune only when the state authority
allowed the subdivisions to operate in a given area.3 7 However, the
Lafayette Court limited its holding by stating that a scrutinized local
agency does not have to rely on specific legislative authorization before
it may assert a state action defense to the antitrust suit.
38
31. See, eg., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52
(1982) (noting that the city ordinance "cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless
it constitutes the action of the [state] itself... or unless it constitutes municipal action
in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy"). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the division
of regulatory powers between states and municipalities.
32. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
33. Id. at 391-92.
34. Id. at 392.
35. Id. at 392 n.6. The defendant utility claimed that the cities tried to restrict
competition within the municipal boundaries by: (1) the use of covenants in their re-
spective debentures needed by the defendant to finance construction of the plant; (2) the
use of long term supply agreements in certain markets; and (3) by requiring certain
customers of the defendant to purchase electricity from the cities as a condition of con-
tinued water and gas service. 435 U.S. at 392 n.6. The cities moved for dismissal of the
counterclaim on the ground that cities and subdivisions of a state are exempt from
antitrust scrutiny under the Parker doctrine. Id. at 392.
36. 435 U.S. at 413. The Court, in a plurality opinion, stated that acts of the state
must be distinguished from acts of subordinate agencies, subdivisions, or officials not
exercising power delegated by the state legislature for the purpose of displacing antitrust
law. Id. at 412.
37. Id. at 413-14. "In light of the serious economic dislocation which could result if
cities were free to place their own parochial interests above the Nation's economic goals
reflected in the antitrust laws.., we are especially unwilling to presume that Congress
intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from their reach." Id. at 412-13.
38. 435 U.S. at 415. To be eligible for the state action exemption, a political subdi-
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In subsequent cases, the United States Supreme Court has further
narrowed the scope of the state action exemption. 3 In California Re-
tail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. , the plaintiff chal-
lenged a California statute requiring wine producers and wholesalers to
post retail prices.41 The statute subjected retail liquor licensees who
undersold the posted prices to a fine and license revocation without a
state review process.42 The Supreme Court established a two-part test
for granting state action antitrust immunity. The state action immu-
nity doctrine applies when a state has: (1) clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed state policy; and (2) exercised active
supervision.43 Applying this test, the Supreme Court refused to grant
immunity because the state-regulated resale price maintenance plan for
wine producers and wholesalers met the first prong of the test, but
failed to meet the second.' Thus, the Court found that the state failed
to actively supervise the price maintenance policy.45
The United States Supreme Court further limited the state action
exemption available for municipalities in Community Communications
Co., Inc v. City of Boulder.'6 In Boulder, the City of Boulder pre-
vision need only show the existence of an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive
activities of subdivisions. Id. This intent can be found where it is clear "from the au-
thority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of." Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
39. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). In
Orrin W. Fox, plaintiffs challenged the California Automobile Franchise Act which reg-
ulates the establishment of new automobile franchises. Id. at 98. The Court held that
because the state directly imposed the Act and the Act served to further the general
economy and welfare of the state, the Parker doctrine protected it from Sherman Act
scrutiny. Id. at 109-11.
40. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
41. Id. at 100.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 105. The Midcal Court stated that if a program enacted by the state or
municipality fails to meet one standard or the other, the program does not receive blan-
ket immunity from federal antitrust suits. 445 U.S. at 105-06.
44. 445 U.S. at 105. Although the State of California directly imposed the statute in
question in furtherance of a legitimate state purpose, the Supreme Court held that it was
not exempt from Sherman Act liability because the state did not actively supervise the
regulation. Id.
45. Id. The Court held that authorizing price setting and enforcing prices estab-
lished by private parties does not rise to the level of active supervision when the state
does not establish prices, review the reasonableness of price schedules, or regulate the
terms of fair trade contracts. Id. at 105-06.
46. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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vented the plaintiff from installing its cable systems by enacting a three
month moratorium on cable television hook-ups.47 During the mora-
torium, the city council drafted a model cable television ordinance to
attract new cable companies to the area.48 Boulder claimed that its
"home rule" powers49 vested the municipality with all the state's sover-
eign powers in local affairs.5" In response, the Supreme Court held the
moratorium ordinance enacted under the Colorado home rule powers
not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.5" The Court stated that despite the
home rule statute, the state had no clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed policy about the moratorium. 2 Thus, the Supreme Court
47. Id. at 45-46.
48. Id. The city council imposed the moratorium to allow them time to draft a
model television ordinance and invite new cable television business to enter the market.
Id. The Boulder City Council believed that, because of the technological cable commu-
nications advances which occurred in the late 1970's, the petitioner cable company
could rapidly expand and effectively preclude entry by competitor cable businesses. 455
U.S. at 44-45. The city council therefore enacted the ordinances to promote competi-
tion. Id. at 45.
49. The Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution provides in pertinent
part:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thou-
sand inhabitants... are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power to
make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its
organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall
supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town
any law of the state in conflict therewith.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all munici-
palities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local
and municipal matters ....
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. The effect of "home rule" charters for municipalities is to
leave the municipality free to manage its own affairs, as long as such matters are local in
their scope, and as long as its government is in accordance with the state laws and the
state constitution. 2 EUGENE MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 9.08, at 855 (3d ed. 1988). Under the Colorado home rule amendment, municipal
ordinances supersede state statutes in local matters. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. See
generally Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10
WM. & MARY L. RFv. 269, 269 (1968) (noting that the "home rule" is one method
municipalities can use to gain a measure of freedom from state control).
50. 455 U.S. at 52-54. Boulder equated its home rule powers to the powers of the
Colorado state legislature and cited Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne Colo., 618
P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980) as authority. Id. at 52 n.15. The petitioner cable company
disputed this construction of Byrne. Id.
51. Id. at 53.
52. 455 U.S. at 55. The Court held that the state's general grant of power to the
municipality does not clearly articulate and affirmatively express state policy. Id. at 55-
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required the state to clearly articulate and affirmatively express any
regulations before allowing a municipality to claim a state action de-
fense to an antitrust suit.
The Supreme Court retreated from its hard stance on the municipal
antitrust exemption in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.53 In Hal-
lie, a Wisconsin city refused to provide sewage treatment services to
surrounding unincorporated territories unless the residents in that ter-
ritory agreed to annexation.54 Wisconsin law authorized cities to con-
struct sewage systems with the right to refuse service.55 The plaintiffs
claimed that conditioning service upon annexation constituted a misuse
of monopoly power in violation of antitrust laws.56 The Hallie Court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held that, although state supervi-
sion is required when private parties engage in anticompetitive con-
duct, the existence of municipal action reduces the dangers of
anticompetitive conduct.57 Once state authorization exists, the Court
56. The municipality must articulate and express a state policy to regulate the specific
activity. Id.
53. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
54. Id. at 36-37. Petitioners included the towns of Hallie, Seymour, Union and
Washington - four unincorporated townships located adjacent to Eau Claire, Wiscon-
sin. Id. at 36. Petitioners sought injunctive relief. Id.
55. 471 U.S. at 41. After the completion of Eau Claire's sewage treatment facility,
the four surrounding towns sought to collect sewage from their residents and transport
the sewage to Eau Claire's sewage treatment plant. Id. at 37. Eau Claire refused to
provide treatment services unless the towns agreed to annexation. Id. Under the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1375 (1988), the City of Eau
Claire obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau
Claire service area. Id. The relevant Wisconsin law provides in pertinent part:
[E]ach village or city may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorpo-
rated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the area within which service will be
provided and the municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond the area
so delineated. Such area may be enlarged by a subsequent ordinance. No such
ordinance shall be effective to limit any obligation to serve which may have existed
at the time the ordinance was adopted.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.069 (2)(c) (West 1990). The Wisconsin law dealing with joint
sewer systems provides in relevant part: "If an application for an annexation referen-
dum is denied under § 66.024(2) or the referendum under § 66.024(4) is against annexa-
tion, the order shall be void. If an annexation proceeding is not commenced within the
30-day period, the order shall become effective." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.07 (Im) (West
1989).
56. 471 U.S. at 41-43.
57. Id. at 46-47. The Court stated that it "may presume, absent a showing to the
contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest." Id. at 45. The Court also
noted that, "[a]mong other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be
exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct." Id. at 45 n.9.
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reasoned that the state need not actively supervise the municipality in
carrying out its delegated role. 8 Moreover, the state authorization at
issue sufficiently reflected a state policy to displace competition with
regulation. 9 The Halie Court indicated that the state need not com-
pel the city to act and need not expressly indicate that its delegation to
municipalities is intended to have anticompetitive effects. 6° The
Supreme Court therefore eliminated the requirement that the state ac-
tively supervise the municipality to qualify for state action exemption
from antitrust laws.
Although Hallie arguably found local governments immune from
antitrust law whenever state authorization exists, the Eighth Circuit
refused to grant state action immunity when a city conspired to violate
antitrust laws. In Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,61
the plaintiff alleged that the city conspired with a shopping mall devel-
oper to eliminate the plaintiff's proposed competing mall.62 The court
did not apply the state action immunity doctrine and held that a con-
spiracy to frustrate normal zoning procedures did not further state pol-
icy when it deprived the plaintiffs of the right to develop their
property.63 Thus, the Eighth Circuit refused to extend the state action
immunity exemption to municipalities when an anticompetitive con-
spiracy exists between government officials and private parties.
The Westborough Mall rationale is consistent with other federal ju-
risdictions which have held that a municipality loses antitrust liability
immunity when a conspiracy to stifle competition exists between gov-
ernment officials and private individuals." However, the foregoing ra-
58. 471 U.S. at 47.
59. Id.
60. 471 U.S. at 43. The Court in Hallie distinguished the Wisconsin statute from
the type of home rule statute in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40 (1982). Id. Although the statute in Boulder allowed the city to decide
every aspect of its cable television policy, the Wisconsin statute specifically authorized
the "cities to provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the express author-
ity to take action that foreseably will result in anticompetitive effects." Id.
61. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
62. Id. at 737.
63. Id. at 746.
64. See, e.g., Oberndorfv. City & County of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1440 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 129 (1990) (implying that the "co-conspirator" exception
is limited to cases of bribery or other overt corruption); Video Int'l Prod. v. Warner-
Amex Cable Communications Co., 858 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1047 (1989) (noting that the bribery of government official would invalidate immunity);
see also Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 744 (N.D.
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tionale is flawed because any "meeting of the minds" may be
characterized as a conspiracy. Perhaps because of the far-reaching im-
pact of these rulings on antitrust law, the Supreme Court recently
chose to review the state action doctrine and how it affects
municipalities.
II. CITY OF COLUMBIA v OMNI OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
INCORPORATED
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ,6, the United
States Supreme Court granted local governments sweeping protection
against antitrust suits for their official actions. The Omni Court ruled
that municipalities may not be sued even if they deliberately conspire
to favor one private entity over another.66 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, stated that municipal action which qualifies as state ac-
tion is automatically exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.67
The Omni majority noted, however, that the only possible exception is
when the government acts as a private party participating in the
market.68
Omni Outdoor Advertising, a billboard company, sought damages
and injunctive relief under the Sherman Act alleging that the city and
the area's dominant billboard company, Columbia Advertising (COA),
prevented it from entering the Columbia market.69 COA executives
Iowa 1979) (noting that a city is not automatically exempt from the Sherman Act if it
uses state-delegated zoning powers to further "an unlawful anticompetitive agreement
with private developers").
65. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
66. Id. at 1351. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that "[t]here is no such con-
spiracy exception." Id. But see supra note 54 indicating several courts of appeals, deci-
sions which have previously recognized the conspiracy exception.
67. 111 S. Ct. at 1353. Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARV.
L. Rnv. 668, 704-06 (1991) (advocating the limitation of the state action "co-conspira-
tor" exception to government officials conspiring with private individuals where both
parties have a financial interest in the action).
68. 111 S. Ct. at 1353. The Court further declared:
This does not mean, of course, that the States may exempt private action from
the scope of the Sherman Act; we in no way qualify the well established principle
that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful."
Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)). See also Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951) (noting that "when a state compels
retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman
Act forbids").
69. 111 S. Ct. at 1347-48. COA tried to prevent Omni from entering the market in
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allegedly met with city officials to seek the enactment of a zoning ordi-
nance that would restrict billboard construction.7'
COA conducted its outdoor advertising business in the Columbia
market for more than forty years71 and owned more than ninety-five
percent of the billboards in the area.72 Omni first tried to enter the
Columbia outdoor advertising market in 198 1.7  COA, which enjoyed
close relations with city officials,74 lobbied to enact a zoning ordinance
to restrict billboard construction.75 In the spring of 1982, the city
council passed an ordinance that placed a moratorium on all billboard
construction without the council's express consent.76 After a state
court declared the ordinance unconstitutional,77 the city asked the
state's regional planning authority to conduct a comprehensive analysis
of the local billboard situation and to develop a valid ordinance.78 In
several ways. Id. at 1347. COA redoubled its billboard construction and modernized
its stock. Id. They also allegedly undertook several anticompetitive actions including
"offering artificially low rates, spreading untrue and malicious rumors about Omni, and
attempting to induce Omni's customers to break their contracts." Id.
70. 111 S. Ct. at 1347. COA executives were not the only individuals who met with
city officials lobbying for the enactment of zoning ordinances restricting billboard con-
struction. Id. Other citizens supporting these restrictions included newspaper article
and editorial writers. Id.
71. Id.
72. 111 S. Ct. at 1347.
73. 111 S. Ct. at 1347.
74. Id.
75. Id. COA first met with the City Zoning Board of Adjustments and then City
Councilman Patton Adams. "The following day, Councilman Adams introduced for
first reading a proposed ordinance that would have barred billboard construction in the
downtown area and the relevant neighborhood absent Council approval." Petitioner's
Brief at 3, City of Columbia & Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991) (No. 89-1671).
76. 111 S. Ct. at 1348.
77. Id. The South Carolina district court struck down this ordinance because it
granted "unconstrained discretion" to the city council and thereby violated both the
South Carolina and Federal Constitutions. Id.
78. Id. The City Council commissioned the Central Midlands Regional Planning
Council (CMRPC) to formulate a comprehensive billboard ordinance. Petitioner's
Brief at 4, City of Columbia & Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991) (No. 89-1671). The CMRPC is a state-author-
ized agency which provides planning services for the four counties and their municipali-
ties in such areas as zoning transportation, health care, and senior citizen services. Id.
at 4 n.3. During the five months between this commission and the enactment of the
ordinance on September 22, 1982, numerous public meetings addressed the CMRPC's
recommendations. Many other discussions occurred between city officials, CMRPC
personnel and billboard operators - including representatives of Omni and COA. Id.
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September 1982, the council enacted a new ordinance to restrict the
size, location, and spacing of billboards.7 9 These restrictions favored
COA, which already had its billboards in place, and severely limited
Omni's ability to compete.80
As a result, Omni sued COA under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act"1 and the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.8 2 Omni
alleged that the ordinances resulted from an anticompetitive conspir-
acy that divested COA of state action immunity."3 Although Omni
obtained a $3,000,000 jury verdict,84 the district court excluded the
city from liability under the Local Government Antitrust Act, 85 be-
cause the city's actions took place outside the scope of the federal anti-
79. 111 S. Ct. at 1348.
80. Id.
81. Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of
antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.
82. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act provides:
(a) Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or
personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or
deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by § 39-5-20 may bring an
action individually, but not in a representative capacity, to recover actual damages.
If the court finds that the use or employment of the unfair or deceptive method, act
or practice was a willful or knowing violation of § 39-5-20, the court shall award
three times the actual damages sustained and may provide such other relief as it
deems necessary or proper. Upon the finding by the court of a violation of this
article, the court shall award to the person bringing such action under this section
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
Section 39-5-20(a) states in pertinent part: "Unfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
83. 111 S. Ct. at 1348.
84. Id. $3,000,000 was the jury verdict after trebling. Id.
85. Id. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 exempts local governments
from paying damages for violations of the federal antitrust laws filed after September 24,
1984. 111 S. Ct. at 1348 n.2. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984.
Although enacted after the events in City of Columbia, the Act may be applied retro-
actively if "the defendant establishes and the court determines, in light of all the cir-
cumstances ... that it would be inequitable not to apply this subsection to a pending
case." 111 S. Ct. at 1348 n.2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1988)). The District Court
determined that it may be applied retroactively and the Court of Appeals refused to
disturb that ruling. 111 S. Ct. at 1348 n.2.
Regarding actions filed prior to that time, the statute provides a mechanism whereby
the courts on a case-by-case basis will determine whether damages were appropriate. 15
U.S.C. § 35.
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trust laws. 6 The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment against both
the city and COA."7
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Omni correctly enlarges the state
action exemption for municipalities. By removing the conspiracy ex-
ception to the state action immunity exemption, the Court clearly es-
tablishes a city's ability to regulate in areas historically within
municipal authority. Without this broad exemption, all anticompeti-
tive regulation would be vulnerable to a conspiracy charge. Public offi-
cials are often forced to support the wishes of one private group of
citizens over another. 'Forcing city governments to choose between sat-
isfying all affected interest groups and facing antitrust liability is im-
practical and unworkable. A plaintiff could allege a conspiracy based
on nothing more than the agreement to impose the regulation in
question.8"
Municipal officials are free to act without the fear of antitrust viola-
tions because the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a conspiracy
exception to the state action immunity exemption. Few municipal ac-
86. 111 S. Ct. at 1348.
87. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, 891 F.2d
1127 (4th Cir. 1989). The Omni Court of Appeals stated, "we... reverse the district
court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the City. We agree that it is
shielded from a damages award; however, we remand for entry of appropriate injunctive
relief." Id. at 1145. The Court of Appeals also reversed the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict to COA and reinstated the jury's damage award. Id. On remand, the Court
of Appeals recommended that the district court consider Omni's motion for treble dam-
ages and attorney fees under the Sherman Act and South Carolina Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act. Id.
88. See also Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961). In Noerr, the Supreme Court held the Sherman Act inapplicable to an
anticompetitive conspiracy among railroads which sought and obtained state legislative
and executive action harmful to their trucker competitors. The conspirators lobbied
through antitruck advertising. Id. at 131. The Court relied on three points: (1) the
Court did not want to limit anyone's constitutional right to petition his government and
the Court feared chilling legitimate modes of government petitioning; (2) the Court
wished to keep the government's channels open for receiving information; and (3) rely-
ing on the history of the Sherman Act, the Court noted the statute's concern with eco-
nomics and not politics. Id. at 137-38. Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc.,
516 F.2d 220, 229 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting the immunity of unethical conduct by city
council members when dealing with the city council as a legislative body); PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRiusT LAW §§ 203-04 (1978 & 1991 Supp.)




tions are immune from a charge of corruption or failure to act in the
public interest.8 9 Virtually all regulation benefits some segments of so-
ciety and harms others. Thus, allowing courts to make an ex post facto
judicial assessment of public officials' actions would severely diminish
municipalities' ability to regulate. 90 Moreover, if the conspiracy excep-
89. See United States Football League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp.
1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In United States Football League, the plaintiff alleged that the
NFL used unnecessarily coercive methods such as threats to leave town to convince
state and/or local governments to lease stadiums to it rather than the plaintiffs. Id. at
1176. The court held the NFL immune from antitrust liability even though their con-
duct may have been anticompetitive. Id. at 1179-80. But see City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1355-56 (1991) in which the Supreme Court
states:
Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust
laws regulate business, not politics; the former decision protects the States' acts of
governing, and the latter the citizens' participation in government. Insofar as the
identification of an immunity-destroying "conspiracy" is concerned, Parker and
Noerr generally present two faces of the same coin. The Noerr invalidating con-
spiracy alleged here is just the Parker invalidating conspiracy viewed from the
standpoint of the private sector participants rather than the governmental partici-
pants. The same factors which... make it impracticable or beyond the purpose of
the antitrust laws to identify and invalidate lawmaking that has been infected by
selfishly motivated agreement with private interests likewise make it impracticable
or beyond that scope to identify and invalidate lobbying that has produced selfishly
motivated agreement with public officials. "It would be unlikely that any effort to
influence legislative action could succeed unless one or more members of the legis-
lative body became . . . 'co-conspirators'" in some sense with the private party
urging such action. And if the invalidating "conspiracy" is limited to one that
involves some element of unlawfulness (beyond mere anticompetitive motivation),
the invalidation would have nothing to do with the policies of the antitrust laws.
Id. (citation omitted).
90. See Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 64,029, at
76,326 (D. Colo. Oct. 9, 1980). Stauffer involved a claim against a town and local
zoning board officials who had allegedly conspired among themselves in rezoning plain-
tiff's property to further their private economic interests. Id. at 76,328. The court
initially denied state action immunity because the alleged "conspiracy" was not author-
ized by state law. Id. In a subsequent unreported opinion, the court dismissed the
action against the officials because zoning board members are entitled to absolute quasi-
judicial antitrust immunity in carrying out their duties. Apparently, the claim against
the town survived. The court must have assumed that a conspiracy among the zoning
board members to serve their personal interests would violate the Sherman Act and
create town liability. See also Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 671
F.2d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1982)(admitting testimony of city council members to distin-
guish their motivations); Scott v. City of Sioux City, 1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,589, at
68,939 (N.D. Iowa June 17, 1983) (invoking state action immunity to shield alleged
conspiracy between city and developers to prevent other development outside an urban
renewal shopping area). Cf. French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (7th Cir.
1970) (expressing the fear that conclusory allegations of conspiracy would make the
federal courts the ultimate supervisors of state law), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971);
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tion remained intact, courts would have to scrutinize the intent of pub-
lic officials.
Congress did not intend to exempt from the Sherman Act only those
state actions undertaken without contact with private individuals who
have a vested interest in the outcome.91 A rule denying Parker protec-
tion based on perceived conspiracies between public officials and af-
fected private individuals throughout the legislative process would
nullify the state action exemption because private interests support vir-
tually all legislation.92
Furthermore, the validity of municipal legislation should not turn on
a court's inquiry into possible corruption of the legislative process.
Congress did not intend to invalidate corrupt government action
through the enforcement of antitrust laws.9 3 If the corruption excep-
tion applied, courts would invalidate corrupt restraints of trade while
exempting precisely the same restraints when they are not based on
corrupt motives. Additionally, the corruption exception to state action
immunity is unnecessary: when corrupt governmental conduct is ifle-
gal under other laws, those laws provide an adequate remedy without
using antitrust laws.94
Erie Builders Concrete Co. v. Erie-Western Pa. Port Auth., 705 F. Supp. 1125, 1130-31
(W.D. Pa.) (exempting actions taken by individual members of Port Authority in their
private capacity under Noerr because it was unclear whether these actions were limited
to persuading the Port Authority to pursue a particular course of conduct), aff'd, 882
F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1989).
91. See I EARL W. KINTER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.18 (1980) (addressing
the intended scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act - to promote the general principle of
"full and free competition" in interstate and foreign commerce). In Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court declared:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions .... [TIhe policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Id. at 4.
92. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the undesirabil-
ity of judicial review of public officials' actions.
93. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of the intended scope
of the Sherman Act.
94. See Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965) (hold-
ing the bribery of state purchasing official not immune from consideration in context of
violation by seller of Robinson-Patman Act; Sherman Act liability not involved), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
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The United States Supreme Court decision in City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. clarifies the type of municipal conduct
that the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits. As a result of the Omni
decision, courts will now properly judge the anticompetitive activities
of local governments and municipalities by the same antitrust standard
applicable to sovereign states.95
David A. Korn*
95. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of local governments and
municipalities serving the needs of the public. See, eg., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 636-37 (1951) (recognizing that municipal judgment of local needs is made from a
more intimate knowledge of local conditions), overruled by Schaumberg v. Citizens for
Better Env't., 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
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